Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary by Neitz, Michele Benedetto
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
2013
Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary
Michele Benedetto Neitz
Golden Gate University School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Courts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michele Benedetto Neitz, Socioeconomic Bias in the Judiciary , 61 Clev. St. L. Rev. 137 (2013)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss1/6
 
 
137 
SOCIOECONOMIC BIAS IN THE JUDICIARY 
MICHELE BENEDETTO NEITZ* 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Judges hold a prestigious place in our judicial system, and they earn double the 
income of the average American household.  How does the privileged 
socioeconomic status of judges affect their decisions on the bench?  This Article 
examines the ethical implications of what Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski 
recently called the “unselfconscious cultural elitism” of judges.**  This elitism can 
manifest as implicit socioeconomic bias.   
Despite the attention paid to income inequality, implicit bias research and 
judicial bias, no other scholar to date has fully examined the ramifications of implicit 
socioeconomic bias on the bench.  The Article explains that socioeconomic bias may 
be more obscure than other forms of bias, but its impact on judicial decision-making 
processes can create very real harm for disadvantaged populations.  The Article 
reviews social science studies confirming that implicit bias can be prevalent even in 
people who profess to hold no explicit prejudices.   Thus, even those judges who 
believe their wealthy backgrounds play no role in their judicial deliberations may be 
influenced by implicit socioeconomic bias.  The Article verifies the existence of 
implicit socioeconomic bias on the part of judges through examination of recent 
Fourth Amendment and child custody cases.  These cases reveal that judges can and 
do favor wealthy litigants over those living in poverty, with significant negative 
consequences for low-income people.   
The Article contends that the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct (the Code), the document designed to regulate the behavior of 
judges, fails to effectively eliminate implicit socioeconomic bias.  The Article 
recommends innovative revisions designed to strengthen the Code’s prohibition 
against bias, and suggests improvements to judicial training materials in this context.  
These changes will serve to increase judicial awareness of the potential for implicit 
socioeconomic bias in their judicial decisions, and will bring this issue to the 
forefront of the judicial agenda.   
 
  
                                                           
 * Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, California.  
The author served as a law clerk for the Honorable Napoleon A. Jones, Jr., in the Southern 
District of California.  I am grateful to Professor Deborah L. Rhode, Professor Eric C. 
Christiansen, Professor Kathleen Morris and Jennifer Pesetsky for their thoughtful comments 
on earlier drafts.  I appreciate the assistance of research assistants Sharon Alkire and Richard 
Hullinger.  This Article is dedicated to Wiley Neitz. 
** United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, C.J., 
dissenting).   
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the early 1970s, Robert William Kras asked the United States Supreme Court 
to allow him to proceed in bankruptcy court without paying the requisite filing fees.1  
Mr. Kras lived in a small apartment with multiple extended family members and his 
younger child was hospitalized with cystic fibrosis.2  Mr. Kras had been unemployed 
for several years, after losing his job with a life insurance company when the 
premiums he had collected were stolen out of his home.3  His wife had to give up her 
employment due to her pregnancy, and she was focused on caring for their ill son.  
The family lived on public assistance benefits and had no real assets.4 
                                                           
 1 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 437 (1973). 
 2 Id.   
 3 Id.   
 4 Id. at 438.   
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Mr. Kras was indisputably living in poverty.  Hoping to improve his prospects 
for future employment, Mr. Kras desired a discharge in bankruptcy.  However, Mr. 
Kras was turned away before he even reached the bankruptcy courtroom because he 
could not afford the $50 in filing fees to submit his bankruptcy petition.5  
The Supreme Court denied Mr. Kras’s request to waive his filing fees, holding 
that the statute requiring payment of fees to access bankruptcy courts did not violate 
the United States Constitution.  The majority opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, 
noted that the filing fees, when paid in weekly $1.92 installments, represented a sum 
“less than the price of a movie and little more than the cost of a pack or two of 
cigarettes.”6  Justice Blackmun declared that if Mr. Kras “really needs and desires 
[bankruptcy], this much available revenue should be within his able-bodied reach.”7  
Using disparaging words such as “little more” and “able-bodied,” the Court 
presumed that any individual could afford the $50 filing fee.8  
In dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall declared the majority of the Court had 
demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of the lives of poor people.9  Justice 
Marshall explained, “It may be easy for some people to think that weekly savings of 
less than $2 are no burden.  But no one who has had close contact with poor people 
can fail to understand how close to the margin of survival many of them are.”10  
Despite the majority’s apparent belief that poor people go to the theater on a weekly 
basis, Justice Marshall made clear that poor people rarely, if ever, see a movie.11  
Instead, the “desperately poor” must choose to use their limited funds for more 
important things, including caring for a sick child as Mr. Kras was required to do.12  
Justice Marshall rebuked his colleagues for their insensitivity to the plight of poor 
people: “[I]t is disgraceful for an interpretation of the Constitution to be premised 
upon unfounded assumptions about how [poor] people live.”13  
Nearly forty years later, the Chief Judge of the Ninth Circuit echoed Justice 
Marshall with similar observations about the assumptions of his colleagues on the 
bench.  In United States v. Pineda-Moreno, a Fourth Amendment case upholding the 
placement of a Global Positioning System (GPS) device on a defendant’s car parked 
outside his modest home, the Ninth Circuit denied the defendant’s petition for a 
rehearing en banc on his motion to suppress the GPS evidence.14  Dissenting from 
                                                           
 5 Id.  This amount represents approximately $250 in 2011 dollars.  Deborah L. Rhode, 
Thurgood Marshall and His Clerks, in IN CHAMBERS: STORIES OF SUPREME COURT LAW 
CLERKS AND THEIR JUSTICES 314, 321 (Todd C. Peppers & Aremus Ward eds., 2012).  
 6 Kras, 409 U.S. at 449.    
 7 Id. 
 8 Karen Gross, In Forma Pauperis in Bankruptcy: Reflecting On and Beyond United 
States v. Kras, 2 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 57, 60 (1994).   
 9 Kras, 409 U.S. at 460 (Marshall, J., dissenting).    
 10 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting)   
 11 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).   
 12 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 13 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 14 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2010).   
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the denial of the petition for rehearing, Chief Judge Kozinski took the analysis one 
step beyond the case’s constitutional implications.15  Chief Judge Kozinski deplored 
the fact that his fellow Ninth Circuit judges failed to appreciate how their decision, 
allowing the placement of the GPS tracking device on the defendant’s car because he 
had not shielded it from public view, would impact poor people differently than 
wealthy people.  Constitutional interpretation should not give preference to wealthy 
individuals, yet “when you glide your BMW into your underground garage or behind 
an electric gate, you don’t need to worry that somebody might attach a tracking 
device to it while you sleep.”16   
Why do some judges overlook the impacts of their decisions on poor people? 
Chief Judge Kozinski posited that the reason lies in “unselfconscious cultural 
elitism.”17 Most likely, the Kras Court and the Pineda-Moreno majority were not 
actively attempting to create laws favoring the rich over the poor.  But this 
consequence is one result of the lack of socioeconomic diversity on the bench.18  
Chief Judge Kozinski noticed that “No truly poor people are appointed as federal 
judges, or as state judges for that matter.  Judges, regardless of race, ethnicity, or sex, 
are selected from the class of people who don’t live in trailers or urban ghettos.”19  
Accordingly, his colleagues did not appreciate that “the everyday problems of people 
who live in poverty are not close to our hearts and minds because that’s not how we 
and our friends live.”20  
Justice Marshall and Chief Judge Kozinski acknowledged the difference between 
judges and most of their litigants: Judges overwhelmingly come from wealthy 
backgrounds, and many have never walked in the shoes of economically 
disadvantaged people.21  In effect, elite judges may render decisions that negatively 
impact poor individuals simply because they do not recognize that they are doing so.   
                                                           
 15 Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120.  For a full examination of this case, see infra Part III.A. 
 16 Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123. 
 17 Id. (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 18 Id. (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 19 Id. (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 20 Id. (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 21 Of course, there are some judges who overcame great poverty and other challenges to 
achieve their roles on the bench.  See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Federal Judge Nominee Troy Nunley 
Works His Way Up, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, July 9, 2012, available at 
http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/Federal-judge-nominee-Troy-Nunley-works-his-way-
up-3692208.php?cmpid=emailarticle&cmpid=emailarticle#photo-3170832 (describing Judge 
Troy Nunley’s path from childhood poverty to a judgeship).  Judge Nunley, a Sacramento 
County Superior Court judge, was nominated by President Obama to the U.S. District Court in 
Sacramento on June 25, 2010.   But such judges are a rarity, particularly in the prestigious 
federal courts.  For example, Supreme Court justices disproportionately come from three Ivy 
League law schools: Harvard, Yale, and Columbia.  SUSAN NAVARRO SMELCER, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R40802, SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, 
PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE, AND LEGAL EDUCATION, 1789-2010 (2010).  Eight of the nine 
current justices attended one of those three law schools.  Id.  Moreover, as discussed infra Part 
II.A., even those judges who came from poverty now earn much higher incomes than average 
Americans. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss1/6
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Opponents seeking to deny Chief Judge Kozinski’s charge of elitism may point 
to the American Bar Association (ABA) Model Code of Judicial Conduct (the 
Code), the model standard of ethics intended to provide guidance for judicial 
behavior.22  The Code specifically prohibits judges from employing bias on the basis 
of socioeconomic status when adjudicating cases.23   Judicial ethicists might 
therefore argue that Chief Judge Kozinski’s observations about the wealthy positions 
of judges are irrelevant to judicial decision-making processes; judges may be 
wealthier than some litigants, but the Code forbids judges from being influenced by 
socioeconomic bias.  Yet the Code’s success in preventing socioeconomic bias is 
subject to some debate.  For example, did the conduct of the Supreme Court majority 
in Kras or the Ninth Circuit panel in Pineda-Moreno rise to the level of bias?    
This Article examines the ethical implications of the “unselfconscious cultural 
elitism” of judges.24  Because judges are more economically privileged than the 
average individual litigant appearing before them, they may be unaware of the gaps 
between their own experiences and realities and those of poor people.  These gaps 
have contributed to patterns of judicial decision-making that appear to be biased 
against poor people as compared to others.   
Although judges are required to decide cases in a neutral and impartial manner, 
every judge may be influenced in some way by his or her personal beliefs. Many 
judges, aware of the potential for this influence, actively work to separate their 
judicial determinations from their personal opinions.  In some cases, however, a 
judge’s particular viewpoints may result in biased decision-making processes—
whether or not the judge is aware that such bias exists.  Bias is defined as 
“inclination; prejudice; predilection,” and judicial bias is “a judge's bias toward one 
or more of the parties to a case over which the judge presides.”25   Moreover, judicial 
bias may be subtle and implicit.   
Part II of this Article begins with consideration of the two manifestations of bias 
at issue in this context: Socioeconomic bias and implicit bias.  Socioeconomic bias 
may be more obscure than other forms of bias, but its impact on judicial decision-
making processes can create very real harm for disadvantaged populations.   
Because socioeconomic bias is subtle, most judges do not explicitly display bias 
against poor people.  Nonetheless, new scientific research confirms that implicit bias 
can be prevalent even in people who profess to hold no explicit prejudices.   Thus, 
Part II explains that even those judges who believe their wealthy backgrounds play 
no role in their judicial deliberations may be influenced by implicit socioeconomic 
bias. 
Part III verifies the existence of implicit socioeconomic bias on the part of judges 
through examination of recent Fourth Amendment and child custody cases.  These 
cases reveal that judges can and do favor wealthy litigants over those living in 
poverty, with significant negative consequences for low-income people.   
Part IV assesses the role of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct (the Code) 
in the elimination of such bias.  The Model Code is designed to ensure fairness and 
neutrality on the bench.  This section recommends changes designed to strengthen 
                                                           
 22 See generally MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (2011).   
 23 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(B) (2011). 
 24 Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
 25 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (9th ed. 2009). 
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the Code’s prohibition against bias, and suggests improvements to judicial training 
materials in this context.  These changes will serve to increase judicial awareness of 
the potential for implicit socioeconomic bias in their judicial deliberations, thus 
minimizing the impact of such biases on poor litigants.  
II.  THE CHALLENGES OF IDENTIFYING IMPLICIT SOCIOECONOMIC BIAS 
A.  The Economic Status of Judges 
Judicial salaries are much higher than those earned by average Americans. 
Nearly all state and federal judges in the United States earn a six figure salary.   For 
example, in 2010, district court judges earned a set salary of $174,000, and circuit 
court judges made $184,000.26  Supreme Court justices make over $200,000.27  
Depending on the jurisdiction, state court judges may make more or less than federal 
judges.  For example, state appellate judges earn salaries ranging from $105,050 in 
Mississippi (the state with the lowest paid state appellate judges) to $204,599 in 
California (the state boasting the highest salaries for its appellate judges). 28  In 2010, 
the median household income was $49,445.29  Thus, judges earn more than double 
the income of the average American.  
Like all people, judges are influenced by their economic backgrounds.30  Since 
people are “more favorably disposed to the familiar, and fear or become frustrated 
with the unfamiliar,” the wealthy positions of most judges may prevent them from 
fully appreciating the challenges faced by poor litigants in their courtrooms.31  Low-
income people “are not just like rich people without money.”32  Workers in low-
wage jobs are often teetering on the edge of abject poverty: “They cannot save, 
cannot get decent health care, cannot move to better neighborhoods, and cannot send 
their children to schools that offer a promise for a successful future.”33   
                                                           
 26 Judicial Salaries Since 1968, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/Viewer 
.aspx?doc=/uscourts/JudgesJudgeships/docs/JudicialSalariescJudi.pdf (last visited Jan. 23, 
2013).  
 27 Id.  Notably, federal judges have not received reliable cost of living pay increases in the 
last decade, and are paid less than some federal employees in the executive branch and 
banking industries.  Federal and Judicial Pay Increase Fact Sheet, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialCompensation/JudicialPayIncreaseFac
t.aspx (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). 
 28 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (NCSC), 36(2) SURVEY OF JUDICIAL SALARIES (Jan. 1, 
2011).  These differences can be attributed to the cost of living discrepancies among various 
states. 
 29 Income Poverty and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2010, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/ 
income_wealth/cb11-157.html.  This amount represented a 2.3% decline from the median in 
2009 as a result of the recent recession.  Id.  
 30 Rose Matsui Ochi, Racial Discrimination in Criminal Sentencing, 24 JUDGES J. 6, 53 
(1985). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Stephen Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L. J. 1049, 1049 (1969-
1970). 
 33 DAVID SHIPLER, THE WORKING POOR: INVISIBLE IN AMERICA 4 (2005). 
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Additionally, living in poverty “creates an abrasive interface with society; poor 
people are always bumping into sharp legal things.”34  Thus, for poor people, 
everyday living requires the “the ability to live with [the] unrelenting challenges and 
chronic instability of being poor.”35   Judges, on the other hand, generally have well-
paid and stable employment positions.36  This discrepancy creates an economic 
imbalance in courtrooms that may result in socioeconomic bias. 
The difference in economic status between judges and litigants has not gone 
unnoticed, and the public is increasingly equating wealth with the ability to obtain 
fairness in American courts. A recent survey by the National Center for State Courts 
found that Californians believe the level of fairness in state courts is least for those 
with low incomes and non-English speakers.37  Nationally, 62% of Americans 
believe the courts favor the wealthy.38   
These statistics reveal the importance of evaluating judicial socioeconomic bias 
in American courtrooms.  If judges’ decisions are influenced—consciously or 
unconsciously—by their elite and privileged status, the public trust in the American 
judicial system will continue to be undermined.  Conversely, increased judicial 
attention to the problem of socioeconomic bias will signal to the public that judges 
recognize the importance of justice for all litigants, regardless of economic class. 
B.  Socioeconomic Bias vs. Class Privilege 
The elite status of most judges enables them to enjoy the benefits of class 
privilege, meaning that their life experiences are different than those of lower-
income people.39  Some judges may not recognize their privileged positions, since 
they “believe that their success is based on their individual merit, gaining the 
‘supreme privilege of not seeing themselves as privileged.’”40 
                                                           
 34 Wexler, supra note 32, at 1050.  
 35 Eden E. Torres, Power, Politics, and Pleasure: Class Differences and the Law, 54 
RUTGERS L. REV. 853, 863 (2002) (citing Alan Wald, A Pedagogy of Unlearning: Teaching 
the Specificity of U.S. Marxism, in PEDAGOGY, CULTURAL STUDIES, AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
125, 143 (Amitava Kumar ed., 1997)).   
 36 Federal judges enjoy lifetime tenure.  U.S. CONST. art. III § 1.  Appointed federal judges 
may serve specific terms.  28 U.S.C.A. § 631(a), (e) (West 2012) (District Court judges 
appoint magistrate judges to their respective jurisdictions to eight-year terms); cf. CAL. CONST. 
art. VI, § 16(d)(2) (When vacancies arise on the California Supreme Court or a court of 
appeal, the Governor appoints judges who hold office until the first general election following 
their appointment.)  By contrast, elected judges may have to run for election to retain their 
positions.  CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 16(c) (California superior court judges are elected to 6-year 
terms.)  
 37 NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS (NCSC), TRUST AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CALIFORNIA 
COURTS: A SURVEY OF THE PUBLIC AND ATTORNEYS (Dec. 2006), available at http://www. 
courts.ca.gov/documents/Calif_Courts_Book_rev6.pdf.    
 38 Kathleen Hall Jamieson & Michael Hennessy, Public Understanding of and Support for 
the Courts: Survey Results, 95 GEO. L.J. 899, 900 (2007). 
 39 See supra Part II.A. 
 40 Lucille A. Jewel, Bourdieu and American Legal Education: How Law Schools 
Reproduce Social Stratification and Class Hierarchy, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 1155, 1195 (2008) 
(quoting PIERRE BOURDIEU & JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON, REPRODUCTION IN EDUCATION, 
SOCIETY AND CULTURE 163 (1990)). 
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Nevertheless, the influence of class privilege may contribute to implicit 
assumptions about members of particular socioeconomic groups, resulting in class 
bias.   For example, class privilege may rise to the level of bias in the case of a judge 
who “acquired his judicial predispositions through the sympathies instilled by a 
corporation practice and other schools of privilege.”41  This type of judge is 
“conscientiously predisposed to favor privileged classes,” and may then “carr[y] that 
predisposition into every case by him considered.”42  While it can be difficult to 
recognize these predispositions, “the conscientious judge who believes in class 
privileges and undemocratic distinctions is . . . more pernicious than the judge who 
is occasionally corrupt.”43 
Class privilege may also manifest as the presumption that all persons have 
similar experiences, exemplified by Justice Blackmun’s assumption in Kras that all 
persons could afford the price of a movie.44  Unlike ordinary citizens, judges have a 
duty to receive information, fairly assess it, and incorporate it into their judgments 
without bias.45  A judge who adjudicates cases based on the implicit assumption that 
all persons are situated similarly to that judge is not properly assessing or 
investigating the facts of a given case.   Treating all parties as though they were 
socioeconomically identical rises beyond privilege to the level of bias, precisely 
because judges have a duty to consider the unique facts of every case.  
C.  The Challenge of Identifying Socioeconomic Bias  
1.  The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct’s Prohibition of Socioeconomic Bias 
The American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial Conduct is intended to 
provide disciplinary guidance to all full-time judges, as well as “anyone who is 
authorized to perform judicial functions,” including a “justice of the peace, 
magistrate, court commissioner, special master, referee, or member of the 
administrative law judiciary.”46  Although the first Canons of Judicial Ethics 
(Canons) were released by the ABA in 1924, the specific prohibition of bias based 
on socioeconomic status was not added until 1990.   During the 1974 revisions to the 
Code of Judicial Conduct, language was proposed that would have prohibited judges 
from treating indigent or welfare litigants differently from their nonindigent 
counterparts.47  The Committee revising the Code rejected this proposal, believing 
that such a specific standard was not required when a judge was already directed to 
be “faithful to the law.”48  Since this standard applied regardless of a litigant’s status 
                                                           
 41 Theodore Schroeder, Social Justice and the Courts, 22 YALE L. J. 19, 25 (1912). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 449 (1973). 
 45 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.2 and R. 2.3 (2011). 
 46 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT § I(B) (2011). 
 47 E. WAYNE THODE, THE REPORTER’S NOTES TO THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 51 
(1973). 
 48 Id. 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol61/iss1/6
2013] SOCIOECONOMIC BIAS IN THE JUDICIARY 145 
 
as an indigent or otherwise, further elaboration of the standard was deemed “counter-
productive.”49 
A different view prevailed during the 1990 revisions to the Code, when the 
Committee chose to include a list of specific classes of prohibited biases on the 
premise “that a specific listing of examples of prohibited bias or prejudice would 
provide needed strength to the rule.”50  Thus, by 1990, the rule prohibiting judicial 
bias changed from a general guideline concerning a judge’s general obligation to 
remain impartial into a specific rule with clear examples of the types of biases 
prohibited by the Code.   
The most recent version of the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct, released in 
2007, retained the list of examples of bias and added the categories of gender, 
ethnicity, marital status, and political affiliation.51  Thus, Rule 2.3 now provides that 
judges shall not “manifest bias or prejudice,” including but not limited to biases 
based on “race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity, disability, age, sexual 
orientation, marital status, socioeconomic status, or political affiliation.”52  This 
enumerated list is not meant to be exclusive; the language “included but not limited 
to” indicates that the list of prohibited biases provides illustrative examples. 53   
The inclusion of socioeconomic bias as one of the specific examples of bias in 
the 1990 Code and subsequent revisions may certainly be seen as progress, since it 
brings judicial attention to the fact that this type of bias exists.  However, this 
obscure form of bias is not clearly explained, leaving judges uncertain about what is 
meant by the phrase “socioeconomic bias.” 
The term “socioeconomic” is defined by Webster’s New International Dictionary 
as “of, relating to, or involving a combination of social and economic factors.”54  
Without any explanation of what these “factors” may be, this vague general 
definition is ambiguous.  Yet the Code’s drafters failed to define the term 
“socioeconomic” in the “Terminology” section of the Code, and it is not defined 
anywhere else in the Code.55  The same is true for the term “bias,” which is also not 
defined in the Code’s “Terminology” section.56 
The failure to define these key terms is problematic in a Code intended to 
provide guidance and serve as the basis for disciplinary procedures for judges.  
Assuming the Code’s drafters intended to prohibit judicial bias against the poor and 
                                                           
 49 Id. 
 50 LISA L. MILORD, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ABA JUDICIAL CODE 18 (1992). 
 51 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(B) (2011). 
 52 Id. 
 53 MILORD, supra note 50, at 18.  Judicial bias has been extensively studied in other 
contexts.  See, e.g., Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 
821 (2011) (empirical study of judicial bias revealed that “[j]udges, it seems, are human.  Like 
the rest of us, they use heuristics that can produce systematic errors in judgment.”)  
 54 WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed.1986). 
 55 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT, Terminology (2011). 
 56 A definition of the term “bias” was proposed, but rejected.  Am. Bar Ass’n (ABA) Joint 
Comm’n to Evaluate the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Summary of Teleconference 
Minutes (Nov. 17, 2003).  The Code does list examples of manifestations of bias.  MODEL 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3, cmt. 2 (2011). 
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disadvantaged economic classes as well as the wealthy and privileged classes, it is 
unclear how these groups should be characterized.  As a term, “the poor” can include 
“all races, colors, ethnicities, regions, and ages of people, although it is heavy on 
women and children . . . . in short, those who at some period of time populate the 
low end of the income distribution scale in the United States are indescribably varied 
and multifaceted.”57  Yet, the Code makes no mention of how the term 
“socioeconomic” should be considered in this context.  Thus, judges are prohibited 
from engaging in a type of bias that is undefined in the Code, raising concerns about 
the enforceability of the Code’s prohibition against socioeconomic bias.  
2.  The Unique Nature of Socioeconomic Bias 
Socioeconomic bias is different from other forms of bias.  First, this type of bias 
is distinctive because American law treats socioeconomic status differently than 
other identities.  There is no fundamental right to be wealthy or “free of poverty,"58  
and the Constitution does not protect socioeconomic rights by assuring all 
Americans economic stability.59  Unlike race or gender, poverty is not a 
classification deserving strict or intermediate scrutiny, and the federal government 
does not ensure full participation in the economic life of the nation. 60  Thus, there is 
no constitutional provision requiring judges to stop and carefully deliberate the 
impact of their decisions on poor people.61  In addition, the focus of most legal 
scholars and activists on race, gender, and other bases for bias has “shifted attention 
away from socioeconomic class.”62  For example, judicial ethics scholars have 
extensively considered racial and gender bias, but have placed little to no emphasis 
on socioeconomic bias in courtrooms.63   In light of our country’s historical 
oppression of women and minority populations, this focus makes sense.  However, 
the growing gap between rich and poor people in the United States demands renewed 
attention to the problem of judicial bias against the poor.64  
                                                           
 57 Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional Status and 
the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355, 358 (2010) (citing JOHN GILLIOM, 
OVERSEERS OF THE POOR: SURVEILLANCE, RESISTANCE, AND THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY 20-21 
(2001)). 
 58 Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Disparate Treatment of Race and Class in 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 111 (2009).  
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 112-13. 
 61 Similarly, there is no constitutional or statutory requirement for employers, government 
agencies, landlords, etc., to consider socioeconomic status in the same way as race or gender. 
 62 Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 124.   
 63 Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 1, 49 (1994) (“There is little 
research on the issue of poverty bias.”). 
 64 The economic gap between rich and poor persons is rising in the United States.  From 
1973 to 2008, the top 1% of Americans saw their share of national income more than double, 
from 8% to 18%.  Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, Income Inequality in the United States, 
1913-1998, 118(1) Q. J. OF ECON. (Feb. 2003) (updated to include the years 1998-2008).  The 
2008 financial crisis had a significant effect on the share of total net worth for American 
households: In 2010, the wealthiest 1% held 34.5% of the nation’s wealth, while the bottom 
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Second, and more problematic, is the fact that class bias is “much more elusive to 
define” than other forms of bias.65  Poor populations are disproportionately people of 
color, and the “line between poverty and racial bias is very blurred.” 66  Judges rarely 
display explicit bias against poor litigants in courtrooms, and statements about 
poverty are deemed less inflammatory than racist or sexist comments made by a 
judge.67 
Moreover, although a person may be born into poverty, the concept of the 
“American dream” implies that “unlike race and gender, poverty is not immutable.”68  
As a result, many members of society view poor people as responsible for their 
socioeconomic status.69  This viewpoint has historical roots in the early American 
conception of poor people as lazy or immoral.70  The poor have traditionally been 
stereotyped as “welfare queens” whose behavior merits the “reasonable suspicion 
and disdain of broader society.”71  Poor persons who apply for welfare benefits may 
be viewed as “presumptive liars, cheaters, and thieves.”72  
This stereotype has severe implications for the fate of poor people in the United 
States: If an individual’s laziness or immorality is responsible for making someone 
poor, why should society (and by extension the justice system) not treat poor people 
accordingly?  The President’s Crime Commission issued a report in 1972 
                                                           
half of American households held only 1% of all American wealth.  Dan Froomkin, Half of 
American Households Hold 1 Percent of Wealth, HUFFINGTON POST, July 19, 2012. 
 65 Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 125 (2009).  Other types of biases, such as 
gender bias, may be more readily identifiable in the courtroom.  For example, a New York 
judge’s statement in 1997 that “[E]very woman needs a good pounding now and then” is a 
clear manifestation of gender bias.  In re Roberts, 689 N.E.2d 911, 913 (N.Y. 1997).  
 66 Nugent, supra note 63, at 49. 
 67 Manifestations of bias against the poor may be overlooked or unnoticed.  For example, 
California Municipal Court Judge Stephen Drew was publicly admonished in 1995 for a 
number of improper judicial actions.  Among the facts giving rise to Judge Drew’s 
admonishment was his failure to appoint counsel for an unemployed defendant, stating that he 
was potentially employable.  Judge Drew ordered the defendant to apply for work to afford 
private counsel.  This action demonstrated socioeconomic bias, but it alone did not result in 
disciplinary action; it was considered as only one of numerous improprieties committed by 
Judge Drew on the bench. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, Judicial Performance 
Commission Issues Public Admonishment of Judge Stephen Drew (July 29, 1995) (public 
admonishment release for Judge Stephen Drew of the Tulane County Municipal Court, 
Dinuba Division), available at http://cjp.ca.gov/res/docs/Public_Admon/Drew_07-96.pdf.   
 68 Barnes & Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 122 (“The American Dream is that, through 
hard work, a person can rise from even a seriously disadvantaged background.”).   
 69 Id. at 125. 
 70 Jordan C. Budd, A Fourth Amendment for the Poor Alone: Subconstitutional Status and 
the Myth of the Inviolate Home, 85 IND. L.J. 355, 407 (2010) (this viewpoint “has animated 
public discourse since the European settlement of North America and served to exclude the 
poor from equal participation in our civic life for over two centuries.”).  
 71 Jordan C. Budd, Pledge Your Body for Your Bread: Welfare, Drug Testing, and the 
Inferior Fourth Amendment, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 751, 772-73 (2011). 
 72 Kaaryn Gustafson, The Criminalization of Poverty, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 
646 (2009). 
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recognizing the dangers of a system in which wealthy judges adjudicate criminal 
cases brought against poor litigants:  
[M]any defendants are not understood by and seem threatening to the 
court and its officers.  Even such simple matters as dress, speech, and 
manners may be misinterpreted.  Most city prosecutors and judges have 
middle class backgrounds and a high degree of education.  When they are 
confronted with a poor, uneducated defendant, they may have difficulty 
judging how he fits into his own society of culture.  They can easily 
mistake a certain manner of dress or speech, [as] alien or repugnant to 
them, but ordinary enough in the defendant’s world as an index of moral 
worthlessness.  They can mistake ignorance or fear of the law as 
indifference to it.  They can mistake the defendant’s resentment against 
social evils with which he lives as evidence of criminality.73  
Thus, judges are not immune from the influence of this stereotype.74  In some 
cases, the fact that poor people are different than lawyers and judges may serve as 
the basis for socioeconomic bias in courtrooms.  Judges, lawyers, and other officers 
of the court are perceived by themselves as hardworking, and they act in expected 
ways.  Poor people may act or appear differently, which can be interpreted by judges 
as a failure to exhibit some of the admirable qualities of the members of the legal 
profession.  Because the experiences of poor litigants are unfamiliar to judges, 
socioeconomic bias may infect a judge’s own decision-making processes.75  
For example, a study commissioned by the Georgia Supreme Court in the mid-
1990’s concluded that the justice system is biased against the poor.76  According to 
an assistant district attorney who participated in the Georgia study, poor people were 
more likely to end up in court, notwithstanding their skin color, because “the 
problems lie not directly with race but rather with financial and social problems.”77  
The study included “attitude surveys” of judicial officers, court clerks, and lawyers.  
Survey comments suggested that “[t]he real evil is not racial bias but lack of 
empowerment for the poor; [p]oor people of little education are victims of bias; 
[t]his is also a class/money problem; i.e.—the better dressed, educated, and wealthier 
litigants are treated better by everyone in the court system.”78  As the study noted, 
socioeconomic bias in courtrooms affects minority populations more seriously, since 
these populations are a “greater portion of the economically and educationally 
                                                           
 73 Ochi, supra note 30, at 8 (citing PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & 
ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 50 (1967)). 
 74 Budd, supra note 71, at 773 (“This conception of the indigent influences judicial 
perceptions as well.”).  
 75 Nugent, supra note 63, at 49.   
 76 Ga. Supreme Court Comm’n on Racial & Ethnic Bias in the Court Sys., Let Justice be 
Done: Equally, Fairly, and Impartially, 42 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 687, 700 (1996). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
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disadvantaged.”79  To compound the problem, persons living in poverty are 
increasingly marginalized and alienated from other members of society.80  
Thus, those seeking to quantify socioeconomic bias on the part of judges face a 
daunting challenge:  The elusive nature of socioeconomic bias, and the fact that it is 
often obscured by racial or gender bias, make it difficult bias to recognize.  In fact, 
the more insidious form of socioeconomic bias is likely to be implicit—an 
unconscious bias against the poor on the part of the judges.81  
Of course, many judges are sympathetic to the plight of the economically 
disadvantaged, and actively work to be aware of their own personal biases.82  As 
discussed in Part II.C infra, this awareness may work to reduce the prevalence of 
biases against poor litigants in courtrooms.83  However, not all biases are overtly 
recognized and consciously reduced; unconscious beliefs about poor people may 
play a larger role in judicial decision-making than has been previously 
acknowledged.   
3.  The Challenge of Identifying Implicit Bias 
Any type of bias can be explicit or implicit.  The term “explicit bias” is used to 
indicate that a person recognizes his or her bias against a particular group, believes 
that bias to be appropriate, and acts on it.84  This is the type of bias that “people 
knowingly—and sometimes openly—embrace.” 85  
Explicit bias on the basis of race or ethnicity has declined significantly over time, 
and is now mostly viewed as “unacceptable” in society.86  As discussed above, 
judges are prohibited by the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct from displaying 
such bias on the bench.87  
Implicit bias is a more subtle form of bias.  It is unintentional,88 representing 
“unconscious mental processes based on implicit attitudes or implicit stereotypes 
which play an often unnoticed role in day to day decision-making.”89  An individual 
                                                           
 79 Id. at 701. 
 80 Budd, supra note 71, at 772.    
 81 See supra Part II.C. 
 82 Torres, supra note 35, at 854 (“ . . . it is important to think about the way in which 
working-class Chicana/o defendants, law students, and lawyers will be experienced by judges, 
juries, professors, and opposing council [sic] who may be of a different class, ethnic, or racial 
background.”). 
 83 Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias: Scientific 
Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 963-64 (2006). 
 84 Irene V. Blair et al., Unconscious (Implicit) Bias and Health Disparities: Where do We 
Go from Here?, 15 PERMANENTE 71, 71 (2011).   
 85 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2009). 
 86 Blair et al., supra note 84, at 71.     
 87 MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.3(b) (2011). 
 88 Blair et al., supra note 84, at 71.    
 89 John F. Irwin & Daniel L. Real, Unconscious Influences on Judicial Decision-Making: 
The Illusion of Objectivity, 42 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 3 (2010). 
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who is careful not to display explicit bias against a particular group may nonetheless 
be influenced by “situational cues,” such as a person’s accent or race, which are 
feeding unconscious stereotypes.90  This type of bias is “largely automatic; the 
characteristic in question (skin color, age, sexual orientation) operates so quickly . . . 
that people have no time to deliberate.”91  
Even those persons who diligently and consciously combat their own explicit 
biases may be influenced to act on the basis of unconscious prejudices.92  This raises 
a particular problem for judges, who are directed by the Code to act free of bias and 
risk being accused of judicial misconduct if they make decisions in favor of one 
group over another.   This also raises concerns for litigants in courtrooms, who may 
be disadvantaged by a judge’s prejudice without the litigants—or even the judge—
being aware of it.  For example, well-meaning judges may not intend to adjudicate 
cases in accordance with social stereotypes regarding the poor.  However, the 
“caricature of the poor” may influence a judge’s decision “whether or not the courts 
consciously acknowledge the connection.”93   
Thus, it is critical to recognize the role that implicit bias may play in judicial 
decision-making. But given the unconscious and automatic nature of implicit bias, 
how can its existence be identified or measured?  Simply asking survey questions, as 
did the Georgia Supreme Court in the study referenced in Part II.C.2., may expose 
explicit bias but will not reveal the presence of implicit bias.   
i.  The Implicit Association Test  
Recognizing this problem, a psychologist from the University of Washington 
developed the “Implicit Association Test” (IAT) in 1995 to measure unconscious 
biases.94  The computerized test “seeks to measure implicit attitudes by measuring 
their underlying automatic evaluation.”95  
The IAT can take different forms, and has been used in hundreds of studies 
spanning many disciplines.96  The most common test “consists of a computer-based 
sorting task in which study participants pair words and faces.”97  The test presumes 
                                                           
 90 Blair et al., supra note 84, at 71; Mahzarin R. Banaji et al., How (Un)ethical are You?, 
81 HARV. BUS. REV. 56, 57 (2003). 
 91 Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969, 
975 (2006); see also Anthony G. Greenwald, Measuring Individual Differences in Implicit 
Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 1464, 1464 
(1998) (“Implicit attitudes are manifest as actions or judgments that are under the control of 
automatically activated evaluation, without the performer’s awareness of that causation.”). 
 92 Banaji et al., supra note 90, at 57 (implicit bias “is distinct from conscious forms of 
prejudice, such as overt racism or sexism.”). 
 93 Budd, supra note 71, at 774. 
 94 Banaji et al., supra note 90, at 57; Blair et al., supra note 84, at 71.  For access to the 
IAT, see Project Implicit, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/takeatest.html (last 
visited Jan. 23, 2013)   
 95 Greenwald, supra note 91, at 1464.   
 96 Blair et al., supra note 84, at 72 (“including psychology, health, political science, and 
market research.”). 
 97 Rachlinski et al., supra note 85, at 1198. 
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that participants will respond more quickly to a concept that has a stronger 
association for that particular individual.98  Subjects are asked “to rapidly classify 
words or images displayed on a computer monitor as ‘good’ or ‘bad.’”99  The speed 
with which the participants respond demonstrates the “well-practiced associations” 
they hold between a particular object and attribute, which essentially measures their 
implicit beliefs.100  In other words, the researchers infer that “the larger the 
performance difference, the stronger the implicit association or bias for a particular 
person.”101   
There is some scholarly dispute about the usefulness of IAT results in predicting 
actual behavior.102  For example, some scholars argue that the IAT may not be a 
measure of unconscious bias, but rather a “subtle measure of conscious bias that 
study participants are unable to conceal.”103   
Despite this debate about the IAT’s limitations, legal scholars have used IAT 
results over the last decade to examine implicit biases in antidiscrimination law,104 
including employment discrimination law,105 and bias in jury selection.106   One 
study, conducted in 2009, analyzed IAT results from a large sample of trial judges 
nationwide.107  
Led by Jeffrey Rachlinski, a professor at Cornell Law, the study sought to 
understand why racial disparities persist in the criminal justice system.  Judges were 
asked to complete the IAT in a form “comparable to the race IAT taken by millions 
                                                           
 98 Blair et al., supra note 84, at 72. 
 99 Irwin & Real, supra note 89, at 3.  For example, in tests measuring implicit racial bias, 
white respondents tend to respond faster “when ‘black and bad’ items require the same 
response and the ‘white’ and ‘good’ items require another response, compared to when ‘black’ 
and ‘good’ responses are the same and ‘white’ and ‘bad’ responses are the same.”  Id. at 72.  
 100 IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW 17 (Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith eds., 
2012). 
 101 Blair et al., supra note 84, at 72. 
 102 See, e.g., Ralph Richard Banks & Richard Thompson Ford, (How) Does Unconscious 
Bias Matter?, 58 EMORY L.J. 1053, 1064 (2009) (“In IAT results, ‘levels of implicit bias 
consistently diverge from levels of conscious bias, but it is difficult to know whether that 
apparent divergence reflects a real underlying difference or is merely an artifact of the 
systematic understatement of levels of conscious bias. Conscious bias might well be 
underreported.’”); see also Raymond J. McKoski, Reestablishing Actual Impartiality as the 
Fundamental Value of Judicial Ethics: Lessons From “Big Judge Davis,” 99 KY. L.J. 259, 
321 (2010-2011). 
 103 Banks & Ford, supra note 102, at 1111. 
 104 Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 91. 
 105 Linda Hamilton Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment 
Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006). 
 106 Mark W. Bennett, Unraveling the Gordian Knot of Implicit Bias in Jury Selection: The 
Problems of Judge-Dominated Voir Dire, the Failed Promise of Batson, and Proposed 
Solutions, 4 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2010).   For a comprehensive look at implicit racial 
bias in various areas of law, see IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, supra note 100.   
 107 Rachlinski et al., supra note 85, at 1232.   
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of study participants around the world.”108  The study found that implicit biases on 
the basis of race were “widespread” among judges.109  In addition, “these biases can 
influence their judgment.”110  On a positive note, the study’s authors noticed that 
judges were aware of potential biases and, if motivated to do so, could compensate 
for implicit bias and avoid its influence.111  
It is perhaps no surprise that “judges, like the rest of us, possess implicit 
biases.”112  However, the results of the Rachlinski study present significant 
implications for judicial ethics guidelines, and the dialogue must be broadened in 
scope.  If judges are found to harbor implicit biases based on race, it is reasonable to 
assume that implicit biases based on other factors, including socioeconomic status, 
may also subtly influence judicial decision-making. 113  
ii.  How Can We Measure Implicit Socioeconomic Bias? 
The IAT has not yet been used to analyze implicit judicial bias based on 
socioeconomic status.  However, two recent studies used the IAT to analyze 
socioeconomic bias in other contexts. 
The first study, published by the American Medical Association (AMA) in 2011, 
analyzed IAT scores in order to “estimate unconscious race and social class bias 
among first-year medical students” at the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine in 
Baltimore.114  The IAT portion of the study used a race test and a “novel” social class 
IAT to identify implicit prejudices based on membership in upper or lower social 
classes.115  The study included clinical vignettes based on race and social class, in 
order to analyze the “relationship between unconscious bias and clinical assessments 
and decision making.”116   
The study produced striking results: 86% of the first-year medical students 
displayed “IAT scores consistent with implicit preferences toward members of the 
upper class.”117  These results were “significantly different” from the student’s stated 
preferences, meaning that implicit bias was prevalent in a majority of the medical 
                                                           
 108 Id. at 1209. 
 109 Id. at 1225. 
 110 Id.    
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at 1232. 
 113 Banaji et al., supra note 90, at 56 (2003) (at least 75% of IAT test takers show implicit 
biases “favoring the young, the rich and whites.”); id. at 58. 
 114 Adil H. Haider et al., Association of Unconscious Race and Social Class Bias with 
Vignette-Based Clinical Assessments by Medical Students, 306 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 942 (2011).     
 115 Id. at 942.  The social class IAT used terms such as “wealthy,” “well-to-do,” “poor,” 
and “disadvantaged.”  Id. at 943.  This social class portion of the IAT has not yet been 
completely validated.  Id. 
 116 Id. at 944.  The high and low socioeconomic class determinations were completed using 
patient occupations.  Id. 
 117 Id. at 949.  69% of the students displayed implicit preferences toward white people.  Id. 
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students despite their spoken beliefs that they did not hold such prejudices.118  These 
findings have important implications for the medical profession, since implicit social 
class biases held by physicians may be a contributing factor to disparities in the 
health care system.119  
The second study, conducted by Irish professors from University College Dublin 
and the University of Limerick, was also published in 2011.  This study sought to 
“establish the presence of prejudice against people from disadvantaged areas” in the 
context of social attitudes in Ireland, in order to examine how such prejudice creates 
“further social exclusion.”120  The study’s authors created an IAT using pleasant and 
unpleasant words with pictures of Limerick city landmarks and disadvantaged 
areas.121  Of the 214 Irish participants, 88 were residents of disadvantaged areas, 
while 126 were from other, more affluent areas.122 
Like the AMA study, the Limerick study revealed significant implicit bias on the 
basis of socioeconomic status.  In fact, all participants exhibited negative 
associations with persons from the disadvantaged parts of Limerick City.123  
Participants who themselves resided in disadvantaged areas were no less biased.124  
The portion of the study examining explicit bias found similar outcomes.  All 
participants viewed persons from disadvantaged areas as “less concerned for others 
and less responsible” than individuals from non-disadvantaged areas.125  The study’s 
authors concluded that residents of poorer communities face prejudice not just on the 
part of outsiders, but also from within their own communities.126  
Hence both studies examining implicit bias based on socioeconomic class 
identified the presence of such bias, one in a group of American medical students 
and the other in an economically diverse group of Irish residents.  Together, these 
results offer evidence to support the theory that implicit socioeconomic bias exists in 
varied populations.  
There is no reason to believe that judges are exempt from implicit bias against 
the poor and disadvantaged.  In light of the extraordinary discretionary power 
granted to judges in the United States, and the potential impact of judicial 
determinations on the lives of individual litigants, this possibility could hold 
                                                           
 118 Id.  The discrepancy between results showing implicit bias and self-reported explicit 
attitudes is a common feature of IAT tests.  See IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS THE LAW, 
supra note 100, at 17-18 
 119 Haider et al., supra note 114, at 949.    
 120 Niamh McNamara et al., Citizenship Attributes as the Basis for Intergroup 
Differentiation: Implicit and Explicit Intergroup Evaluations, 21 J. CMTY. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCH. 243, 246 (2011).   
 121 Id. at 247.   
 122 Id.     
 123 Id. at 251.   
 124 Id.  Other IAT studies have also found individuals from “bias-affected groups” who 
“sometimes harbor implicit biases against their own group.”  IMPLICIT RACIAL BIAS ACROSS 
THE LAW, supra note 100, at 18. 
 125 McNamara et al., supra note 120, at 251.   
 126 Id. at 252.   
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significant consequences for the fairness of the judicial system.  It is also crucial to 
identify implicit biases because recognition of such bias may enable judges to 
minimize its influence.127 
How can we measure whether implicit bias on the basis of socioeconomic status 
exists in American courtrooms?  In the absence of systematic empirical data, this 
Article will examine cases demonstrating the prevalence of implicit bias against the 
poor in American courtrooms.  
III.  IMPLICIT SOCIOECONOMIC BIAS IN FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CHILD CUSTODY 
CASES 
A.  Implicit Socioeconomic Bias in Fourth Amendment Cases 
As the federal courts slowly chip away at the constitutional rights of poor 
people,128  the implicit biases of federal judges who are removed from the realities of 
poor people are becoming increasingly apparent.  This section will examine two 
recent Fourth Amendment cases through the lens of judicial socioeconomic bias.  
These cases reveal the failures of federal judges to appreciate the unique challenges 
faced by low-income populations.  
The first case, United States v. Pineda-Moreno, is notable for the dissenting 
opinion written by Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski.129  The police came 
onto Mr. Pineda-Moreno’s driveway in the middle of the night to attach a GPS 
tracking device to his car.130 Using this device, police were able to track Mr. Pineda-
Moreno’s movements.131  After he was charged with conspiracy to manufacture 
marijuana and manufacturing marijuana, Mr. Pineda-Moreno sought to suppress the 
evidence obtained from the GPS tracking device.132  
                                                           
 127 Rachlinski et al., supra note 85, at 1225. 
 128 See, e.g., Sanchez v. Cnty of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Budd, 
supra note 71, at 751; Christopher Slobogin, The Poverty Exception to the Fourth 
Amendment, 55 FLA. L. REV. 391 (2003).   
 129 United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d 1120, 1120 (9th Cir. 2010).  Eighteen months 
after the opinion discussed in this Article was published, the United States Supreme Court 
held in United States v. Jones that attachment of a GPS tracking device to a vehicle, and 
subsequent use of the GPS device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, was a 
Fourth Amendment search.  United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, at Syllabus (2012).  In 
light of the Jones decision, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Pineda-Moreno and 
remanded the case to the United States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.  The Ninth 
Circuit held on remand that the police’s conduct in attaching the tracking devices in public 
areas and monitoring them was authorized by then-binding circuit precedent, and suppression 
of the GPS evidence was not warranted.  United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087, 
1091 (9th Cir. 2012).  The Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in the case on 
January 22, 2013.  Pineda-Moreno v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 994 (2013).  The ultimate 
disposition of this case does not impact the observations about socioeconomic bias made by 
Chief Judge Kozinski in his dissent to the denial of rehearing en banc.  Nor does the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision on remand affect the analysis described herein. 
 130 Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1121. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1214, vacated, 132 S. Ct. 1533 (2012). 
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Pineda-Moreno claimed that the police actions on his property violated his 
Fourth Amendment search and seizure rights.133  The court disagreed, reasoning that 
the driveway was “only a semi-private area,” and that “‘[i]n order to establish a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in [his] driveway, [Pineda-Moreno] must support 
that expectation by detailing the special features of the driveway itself (i.e. 
enclosures, barriers, lack of visibility from the street) or the nature of activities 
performed upon it.’”134   
Pineda-Moreno’s petition for rehearing en banc was denied.135  In his dissenting 
opinion, Chief Judge Kozinski noted the legal erosion of Fourth Amendment privacy 
protections.  He specifically discussed the connection between poverty and 
diminished Fourth Amendment rights.136  Recognizing that wealthy persons are able 
to protect their privacy with “the aid of electric gates, tall fences, security booths, 
remote cameras, motions sensors and roving patrols,”  Chief Judge Kozinski 
explained that those who are not able to afford such protections will be subject to 
police searches on their property.137  In contrast, if Mr. Pineda-Moreno had been able 
to afford a gate, a garage, or some other method of shielding his car from the street, 
his privacy rights would have been protected.138  
Chief Judge Kozinski was clearly frustrated by his fellow judges’ failure to 
recognize how their ruling would impact poor people.  The Ninth Circuit judges 
either did not understand or chose to ignore the fact that this decision created a two-
tiered structure of privacy rights: Wealthy people with gates and garages would be 
protected from police incursion onto their properties, while poor people who parked 
on the street would be subject to police searches without Fourth Amendment 
protection.  This is the crux of implicit socioeconomic bias: Judges without exposure 
to the lives of low-income people simply don’t appreciate the realities faced by poor 
individuals. As a result, these judges make critical legal decisions from a place of 
privilege, detrimentally impacting people from lower economic classes. 
Similar implicit bias against the poor is apparent in Sanchez v. County of San 
Diego, another Fourth Amendment case.139  San Diego County implemented a 
program in 1997 requiring all welfare applicants to consent to a warrantless home 
visit from an investigator.140  This mandatory visit, which included an interview and 
a “walk through” the home by district attorney fraud investigators, was designed to 
ensure that applicants were not committing welfare fraud.141  An applicant who 
                                                           
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. (quoting Maisano v. Welcher, 940 F.2d 499, 503 (9th Cir. 1991)). 
 135 Pineda-Moreno, 591 F.3d at 1215. 
 136 Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123; see also Budd, supra note 71, at 765.   
 137 Pineda-Moreno, 617 F.3d at 1123. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Sanchez v. Cnty of San Diego, 464 F.3d 916, 916 (9th Cir. 2006).  When the Ninth 
Circuit denied Rocio Sanchez’s petition for rehearing en banc, Judge Harry Pregerson filed a 
dissenting opinion noting that, “This case is nothing less than an attack on the poor.”  Id. at 
969 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
 140 Id. at 918.   
 141 Id. at 919. 
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refused the home visit would be deemed as failing to “cooperate” and would be 
denied benefits.142  
Welfare applicants filed a class action lawsuit claiming that the home visit 
program violated the U.S. and California Constitutions and California welfare 
regulations. The U.S. District Court held the program constitutional, relying on the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s determination in Wyman v. James that “rehabilitative” visits 
to welfare recipients’ homes were constitutional.143   
When the case reached the Ninth Circuit, a divided panel affirmed the lower 
court’s decision.  The majority opinion, written by Judge Tashima, equated San 
Diego County’s home visits with the rehabilitative home visits at issue in Wyman.  
Since the visits were not related to a criminal investigation, and welfare applicants 
could deny consent to the home visits without incurring criminal consequences, the 
majority held that the home visits were reasonable.144  Additionally, the majority 
held that the County’s welfare system constitutes a “special need” beyond general 
law enforcement purposes, finding that, on balance, the government interests at stake 
justified the privacy intrusion of a home visit.145  Judge Raymond C. Fisher dissented 
from the majority opinion, writing that the San Diego program in Sanchez, which 
allowed district attorney investigators with no social work training to enter welfare 
applicants’ homes for the purposes of fraud detection, differed from the 
rehabilitative visits at issue in Wyman.146 
The majority opinion in Sanchez has significant implications for the privacy 
rights of poor people, and the case has been thoroughly considered in that context by 
other scholars.147  From a judicial ethics perspective, the majority’s opinion exposes 
implicit socioeconomic bias and a profound disregard for the realities of poor people.  
For example, explaining the court’s justification for the premise that home visits 
are not searches under the Fourth Amendment, Judge Tashima wrote that “there is 
no penalty for refusing to consent to the home visit, other than denial of benefits.”148  
But as the Supreme Court recognized in Goldberg v. Kelly, welfare aid represents 
“the very means by which to live” for poor people.149  For many welfare applicants, 
receipt of benefits represents the difference between life and death.  Yet in effect, the 
Sanchez court assumed that welfare applicants do not actually need benefits.150  The 
                                                           
 142 Id.  
 143 Id. at 922-23; Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 320 (1971); see also Recent Cases, 
Constitutional Law—Fourth Amendment—Ninth Circuit Upholds Conditioning Receipt of 
Welfare Benefits on Consent to Suspicionless Home Visits—Sanchez v. County of San Diego, 
464 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2006), 120 HARV. L. REV. 1996, 1997 (2007).   
 144 Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 925. 
 145 Id. at 927-928. 
 146 Id. at 932 (Fisher, J., dissenting). 
 147 See Budd, supra note 71, at 771 (2011); Recent Cases, supra note 143, at 1996.  
 148 Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 921 (emphasis added).   
 149 Goldberg v. Kelly, 297 U.S. 254, 264 (1970); see also Recent Cases, supra note 143, at 
2002.  
 150 Recent Cases, supra note 143, at 2002.  
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court’s treatment of welfare aid as an option which can be easily denied “evinces a 
stark refusal to acknowledge the dire situation of welfare recipients.”151   
Judge Fisher’s dissent, like Chief Judge Kozinski’s in Pineda-Moreno, pointed 
out that the court’s analysis would likely be different if it were the judges’ own 
residences subject to intrusion by government investigators.  Observing that the San 
Diego home visit program essentially permits “snooping” in “medicine cabinets, 
laundry baskets, closets and drawers for evidence of welfare fraud,” Judge Fisher 
doubted “my colleagues in the majority would disagree that an IRS auditor’s asking 
to look in such places within their own homes to verify the number of dependents 
living at home would constitute snooping.”152 
Judge Fisher’s point highlights the implicit socioeconomic bias in this case. 
According to the majority, poor welfare recipients being forced to open their homes 
to government examination makes sense, since the government must ensure poor 
people are not committing fraud.   But requiring wealthy individuals to do the same 
thing for purposes of detecting tax fraud would be unjustifiable. 
Embedded in this line of reasoning is the unspoken belief that poor people are 
often dishonest and deserving of government inspection.153  The Sanchez court, 
“while not confessing bias” in an explicit manner, demonstrated bias “without 
apology or pretense” and embraced “the stereotype of the immoral poor.”154  This is, 
of course, an unmistakable example of implicit socioeconomic bias. 
Statements made during oral argument in Sanchez illuminate this point more 
clearly.  Judge Kleinfeld, perhaps inadvertently, revealed a fundamental 
misconception of the lives of poor people:  
I mean, you walk in and you see the $5,000 widescreen TV, and the 
person says, “oh, I have all this trouble supporting my children ‘cause I 
don’t have a man to help me in the house, and there’s obviously a man to 
help her in the house—and that’s seeing if the charity is going where it’s 
supposed to go . . . .  And you open a closet and you see four suits . . . and 
the golf clubs of the person that doesn’t live there, supposedly—same 
thing, isn’t it?155  
As Professor Jordan Budd explains, when a federal judge adjudicating a welfare 
case “suggests that the question plausibly turns on the prospect of welfare recipients 
cashing government checks to help cover the cost of greens fees, business attire, and 
in-home theatre systems, the reality of judicial bias is apparent.”156  Even Judge 
Kleinfeld’s choice of words is revealing:  According to Supreme Court precedent, 
welfare benefits are not considered to be “charity.”157  Much like the Supreme Court 
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 152 Sanchez, 464 F.3d at 936. 
 153 For a discussion of stereotypes about the poor, see supra Part II.C.2.  
 154 Budd, supra note 57, at 406.  
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judges excoriated by Justice Marshall in Kras for their lack of awareness of the real 
challenges facing poor people, the majority in Pineda-Moreno and Sanchez came to 
their conclusions from mistaken assumptions about people who live in an economic 
class different from their own.  These judicial assumptions have consequences; the 
implicit beliefs about poverty underlying these court opinions resulted in a 
substantial abrogation of the constitutional protections of poor persons.  
B.  Implicit Socioeconomic Bias and Child Custody Determinations 
Federal judges are not the only members of the bench who exhibit implicit 
socioeconomic bias.  In family court, child custody determinations may also be 
affected by implicit judicial bias against poor parents. 
The general standard for determining which parents should take custody of a 
child is the “best interests of the child” test, which “asks judges to determine custody 
‘according to the best interests of the child’ and to ‘consider all relevant factors.’”158  
Most states and the District of Columbia provide statutory factors to be considered in 
such cases.159  A handful of states draw the relevant factors from common law.160 
Some states require judges to consider the capacity of a parent to provide a child 
with material needs, including food, clothing, and medical care.161   It is certainly 
true that the ability to provide necessary resources should be considered in 
determining where to place a child.162  But beyond these basic needs, most states do 
not include the wealth of either parent as a factor to consider in child custody cases.  
Indeed, a few states, such as California, prohibit judges from considering “the 
relative economic positions of two parents” as a “basis upon which to base a 
determination of child custody.”163  
                                                           
benefit on the condition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right’—reverted to a 
pre-Goldberg vision of welfare.”). 
 158 Jennifer E. Horne, Note, The Brady Bunch and Other Fictions: How Courts Decide 
Child Custody Disputes Involving Remarried Parents, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2073, 2075 (1993). 
 159 See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 16-914(a)(3)(A)-(Q) (2001); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 
25.24.150(C)(1)-(9) (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124(1.5)(a)(I)-(XI) (West 
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 160 See, e.g., Martin v. Martin, 623 So. 2d 1167, 1169 (Ala. Civ. App. 1993); Wagner v. 
Wagner, 674 A.2d 1, 19 (Md. 1996); Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 
1983); Martin v. Martin, 846 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); Johnson v. Johnson, 163 
S.E.2d 229,232 (S.C. 1968); Wiedenfeld v. Wiedenfeld, 774 N.W.2d 288, 291 (S.D. 2009); 
Vazquez v. Vazquez, 292 S.W.3d 80, 85 (Tex. Ct. App. 2007). 
 161 See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 134(3) (2012); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(c) 
(West 2012); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(b)(2) (West 2012). 
 162 Carolyn J. Frantz, Note, Eliminating Consideration of Parental Wealth in Post-Divorce 
Child Custody Disputes, 99 MICH. L. REV. 216, 220 (2000) (“The view that financial resources 
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 163 Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486 (Cal. 1986); see also R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 15-5-
16(d)(2) (West 2012) (“In regulating the custody and determining the best interest of children, 
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Despite these statutory and common law guidelines, child custody is an area of 
adjudication with a great deal of judicial discretion.164  This discretion may give 
“free reign to . . . distorting unconscious biases, resulting in custody awards that are 
not necessarily in the best interests of a child.”165  Judicial discretion, coupled with 
the fact that most judges are economically privileged and may “exaggerate” the 
importance of wealth in a child’s life, creates the potential for implicit 
socioeconomic bias in child custody cases.166 
For example, the Supreme Court of North Dakota recently reversed a child 
custody determination in Duff v. Kearns-Duff, holding that the lower court 
impermissibly relied on wealth as a relevant factor.167  North Dakota’s statutory 
factors do not include the consideration of economic status,168 and case precedent 
explicitly held that “money alone” does not signify a parent’s inclination to provide 
for the children.169   Even so, the lower court in Duff, faced with making a “difficult 
choice for custody between two apparently fit parents,” resolved the case by relying 
on the parties’ recent financial contributions to the marriage.170  Since the mother in 
Duff was a radiologist earning $600,000 annually, while the father was enrolled in a 
doctoral program at North Dakota State University, the mother had supported the 
family “almost exclusively” for the last few years.171  The lower court held that the 
mother’s income should be viewed in her favor, and granted custody to her.172 
The father appealed to the state Supreme Court, arguing the lower court’s 
decision to award custody to the parent earning the most money was erroneous.173  
The Supreme Court agreed, rejecting the idea that a parent’s financial contribution to 
a marriage is rationally related to the best interests of the children.174  The Supreme 
                                                           
the fact that a parent is receiving public assistance shall not be a factor in awarding custody.”); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04(F)(3) (West 2012) (“When allocating parental rights and 
responsibilities for the care of children, the court shall not give preference to a parent because 
of that parent’s financial status or condition.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665(c) (West 2012) 
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 164 For an assessment of judicial ethics issues in juvenile courts, see Michele Benedetto 
Neitz, A Unique Bench, A Common Code: Evaluating Judicial Ethics in Juvenile Court, 24 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 97 (2011). 
 165 Frantz, supra note 162, at 227. 
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 167 Duff v. Kearns-Duff, 792 N.W.2d 916 (N.D. 2010). 
 168 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-09-06.2(1) (West 2012). 
 169 Duff, 792 N.W.2d at 920 (citing P.A. v. A.H.O., 757 N.W.2d 58 (N.D. 2008)). 
 170 Id. at 921.  
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23Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2013
160 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:137 
 
Court held that the lower court misapplied state law with its reliance on financial 
contributions, and remanded the case for reconsideration.175 
The lower court’s decision in Duff was clearly influenced by the belief that a 
wealthier parent is better able to raise her children.  As the Supreme Court pointed 
out, this is not a legally correct assumption upon which to build a child custody 
determination.  But the fact that the lower court defied case precedent to include 
wealth as a relevant factor indicates the presence of socioeconomic bias:  The father 
was penalized solely for the fact that he made less money than his spouse.   
This case exemplifies the complex nature of socioeconomic bias.  The lower 
court arguably displayed explicit socioeconomic bias in his decision, since the 
mother’s wealth was openly relied upon as the basis for the custody decision.  
However, neither the North Dakota Supreme Court nor any other observer has called 
for the lower court judge to be disciplined for socioeconomic bias.  Thus, though the 
judge’s assumptions about wealth were inaccurate, legally erroneous, and served as 
the basis for judicial bias, his assumptions were not questioned by judicial 
disciplinary authorities.  
Yet, this is also a case of implicit socioeconomic bias; without any proof, the 
lower court judge presumed that wealth equaled the best interests of the children.  
Nothing in the case record would support this assumption.  To reach this conclusion, 
the judge must have held an implicit belief that a wealthy parent is a better parent 
than a less wealthy parent.   
A similar pattern of implicit socioeconomic bias is apparent in West v. West, a 
2001 case.176  In West, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed a decision granting 
sole custody to a father on the ground that the father was going to remarry. 177 The 
mother relied on her parents to assist with caring for her child.  She could not afford 
to stay home all day with her son, but instead needed to work for a living.   
In a conclusory fashion, the lower court had accepted that living in a two-parent 
household, rather than with a less wealthy single working mother, would be in the 
best interest of the child.  The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case, 
holding that the lower court’s “assumption that a divorced parent who remarries can 
provide a better home than an otherwise equally competent parent who remains 
single” is erroneous.178 
The Supreme Court chastised the lower court judge for its “unexplained 
assumption that the added physical convenience of in-home care that [the child] 
might receive from his new second parent” outweighed the “less tangible, but 
potentially vital emotional benefits he might receive by maintaining his close and 
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 176 Some child custody cases demonstrate implicit socioeconomic bias with an erroneous 
emphasis on a parent’s need to place a child in childcare while the parent works.  See, e.g., In 
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already-established ties to [his mother] and his maternal grandparents.”179   The 
Supreme Court also found fault with the lower court for ignoring the potential stress 
that comes from living with a step-parent.180  
The lower court judge in West manifested implicit bias based on socioeconomic 
grounds. The judge did not overtly cite financial considerations in his decision, and 
there was no evidence in the record that the child would receive superior care with 
his father and stepmother than with his single working mother.181  Nevertheless 
inherent in the lower court’s conclusion that the father’s two-parent household “will 
be the better one for [the child]’s future”182 is the implicit belief that a stay-at-home 
stepparent who could afford not to work would provide a better home than a working 
parent.  If this belief were permitted to guide child custody determinations, the 
wealthier parent who could stay at home would always be deemed the better parent. 
These cases raise troubling implications for family court adjudications.  While 
some degree of judicial discretion is necessary in family court, judges should not be 
permitted to be influenced by stereotypes regarding the connection between 
economic wealth and one’s fitness as a parent.   In addition, there are fewer 
published appellate opinions from family courts than from federal district courts.183  
As a result, litigants may not even be aware that their financial status is being 
inappropriately considered by the judge deciding their case.  These risks highlight 
the need for action to address implicit socioeconomic bias in judicial determinations. 
IV.  PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS 
The problem of implicit socioeconomic bias on the part of judges is increasingly 
recognizable, raising significant concerns for judicial ethics observers.  Litigants 
must be assured of fairness when they enter a courtroom, regardless of their 
economic status.  Although this elusive problem may not be easily resolved, the 
proposals discussed herein represent low-cost ways to address these concerns. 
A.  Judicial Discipline: An Ineffective Solution  
A deceptively simple solution to the problem of implicit socioeconomic bias on 
the bench would be judicial discipline:  Reprimand or remove those judges who 
violate the Code’s prohibition of socioeconomic bias.  Unfortunately, judicial 
discipline under the Code in its current form would not succeed.  Recognizing that 
most incidents of judicial socioeconomic bias are based on implicit (and therefore 
unconscious) biases, “judges may not be aware of the errors they are making.  The 
result is still corruption and bias, but this explanation does not rely on some ethical 
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 183 In 2011, only twenty-two published appellate opinions originated from family courts.  
Westlaw search of database “California State Reported Cases” using search terms (DA(aft 12-
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failing on the part of the judge.”184  Indeed, no observer has called for disciplining 
the Ninth Circuit judges who demonstrated implicit socioeconomic bias in the 
Pineda-Moreno or Sanchez cases, or the judges in the child custody cases discussed 
above.  Thus, disciplining judges for unconscious biases is not a realistic solution.   
But if “instead of worrying about crooked judges, we should worry about decent 
judges who are susceptible to the same sort of cognitive errors that affect the rest of 
us,” how can the justice system (and judicial disciplinary systems) ensure that 
judicial decisions are fair and unbiased?185   The natural place to implement more 
effective debiasing strategies is within the document designed to guide judicial 
behavior:  The ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. 
B.  Clarifying the ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct  
Several changes in the Code would bring awareness of implicit socioeconomic 
bias on the bench.  First, the Code must properly define the term “socioeconomic” in 
its Terminology section.  The definition should be more specific than that offered by 
Webster’s New International Dictionary,186 and should include the following 
language: 
Socioeconomic: of, relating to, or involving a combination of social and 
economic factors, including living situation, employment status, financial 
net worth, and family circumstances. 
This expanded definition would instruct judges about the varied factors within 
the term “socioeconomic,” offering clear guidance to judges seeking to avoid 
socioeconomic bias on the bench.  Moreover, because socioeconomic bias is often 
unconscious, expanding this definition would make judges more aware that this type 
of bias exists. 
Second, the Code should bring much-needed focus to the problem of 
socioeconomic bias by removing this form of bias from the enumerated list of 
prohibited bias.  Rather than being listed as the second-to-last form of prohibited 
biases, socioeconomic bias merits a separate sentence.  A sentence should be 
included at the end of Rule 2.3(b) reading:  
A judge shall pay particular attention to avoid bias or prejudice on the 
basis of a litigant’s socioeconomic status. 
Singling out socioeconomic bias in this way would encourage judges to reflect 
on the possibility that their own economic status affects their judicial decision-
making process.  In addition, it would empower litigants by stressing the importance 
of the Code’s prohibition of this form of bias.  Litigants who believe their cases were 
inappropriately influenced by socioeconomic bias would likely feel empowered to 
challenge a judicial determination with this stronger Code language to support their 
claims. 
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Third, the Code must include some reference to the problem of implicit bias.  
This issue was raised during the public comment period for the 2007 revisions to the 
Code.  In a statement submitted to the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the 
Model Code of Judicial Conduct, Jennifer Juhler of the Iowa State Court 
Administrator’s Office and Judge Mark Cady of the Iowa Supreme Court 
recommended the following additions: 
(1)Judges should set aside time to examine personal views and to uncover 
unconscious bias.  Such activities will promote fairness and justice. 
(2)A judge should take part in activities designed to uncover subconscious 
bias and to learn as much about how to understand the role of such bias in 
decision-making.  Each judge must be diligent to a process of self-
examination to minimize the impact of personal bias in the administration 
of justice.187 
These suggested comments were not adopted by the ABA Commission.  In light 
of studies demonstrating the prevalence of implicit bias, as well as cases revealing 
implicit socioeconomic bias on the bench, the Commission’s rejection of these 
comments was inappropriate.  As the history of the Code of Judicial Conduct 
demonstrates, judicial standards should evolve with our new understanding of 
implicit bias. 
Implicit bias may be difficult to identify, especially in the elusive form of 
socioeconomic bias, but the Code should bring awareness to judges that this type of 
bias may be pervasive.   Inclusion of the comments above would pressure judges to 
consider implicit bias in all forms.  Since many persons can overcome implicit biases 
with enough knowledge and intent to do so,188 the Code’s recognition of this problem 
would serve as a catalyst to persuade judges to minimize implicit bias on the bench.   
C.  Judicial Trainings 
Clarifying the Code is not the only way to minimize implicit socioeconomic bias.  
Indeed, some would argue that the impact of the Code is limited, since “[j]udicial 
ethics, where it counts, is hidden from view, and no rule can possibly ensure ethical 
judicial conduct.”189   
Although judges may not regularly review the Code of Judicial Conduct, all 
judges must attend regular educational trainings.  For example, every new judge in 
California takes part in two ethics courses within the first year on the bench, one 
within the first few weeks of a judicial appointment and the second within the first 
year of appointment.190   Federal judges are also thoroughly trained in their first 
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years on the bench, with week-long orientation programs offered to district judges 
and separate trainings for appellate judges.191  The Federal Judicial Center, the 
education and research agency of the federal judicial system, conducts continuing 
education trainings for federal judges and court employees.192  These trainings 
include updates on judicial ethics.193   
The National Center for State Courts, recognizing the pervasive nature of 
implicit bias on the bench, produced a film and other resources about implicit bias as 
part of the National Campaign to Ensure the Racial and Ethnic Fairness of America’s 
State Courts.194  This campaign includes:  (1) an implicit bias “tool box” with 
resource materials to raise awareness; (2) a video discussing “implicit bias in the 
justice system; and (3) a curriculum/ follow-up discussion outline that can be 
tailored to specific jurisdictions.”195  It is encouraging to note that implicit racial and 
gender biases on the part of judges are increasingly recognized by scholars and 
judicial training experts.  However, these training materials must be expanded to 
include implicit socioeconomic bias. 
Admittedly, not all forms of judicial training may be useful.  Simply learning 
about unconscious bias generally may not change judicial behavior.196  It would be 
more valuable to provide judges the opportunity to recognize and address their own 
implicit biases, since “making someone aware of potential biases, motivating them 
to check those biases, and holding them accountable should have some effect on the 
translation of bias to behavior.”197   
An effective training model would therefore include the presentation of an 
Implicit Association Test to judges, specifically designed to test implicit 
socioeconomic bias.  The IAT test has been characterized as “a powerful and 
personalized starting point in educating about implicit bias.”198   Once judges 
discover that they may hold implicit biases against the poor, the training should 
provide explanatory hypotheticals to demonstrate how this implicit bias can affect 
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judicial determinations.  The cases discussed in Part III, supra, would provide 
glaring examples of this effect.  Finally, rather than simply admonishing judges to 
avoid the influence of this bias, the judges should be asked to brainstorm about 
concrete ways to minimize implicit socioeconomic bias in their own decision-
making processes.   In this way, judges can create their own methods to combat 
implicit biases.  The ideas generated during these brainstorming sessions could be 
shared with other judges in subsequent trainings.  Regardless of the specific format, 
judges must be made aware of the prevalence of implicit socioeconomic bias on the 
bench.  
Off-site visits represent another way for judges to combat implicit biases.  
Studies show that implicit biases are “malleable” and may be reduced through 
exposure to examples that go against stereotypes.199  Federal judges visit federal 
prisons as part of their orientation programs, in order to “view firsthand the 
conditions that defendants they sentence will confront.”200  Similarly, judges could 
visit low-income neighborhoods to learn more about the struggles faced by poor 
persons in their jurisdictions.  Housing court judges could visit housing projects and 
other low-income homes. The Pineda-Moreno majority may have benefited from 
visiting the home of Mr. Pineda-Moreno; seeing the street where Mr. Pineda-Moreno 
parked may have sparked an understanding of the differences between his life and 
theirs.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
When Justice Marshall retired, one of his colleagues on the bench observed that 
Justice Marshall “characteristically would tell us things that we knew but would 
rather forget; and he told us that we did not know due to the limitations of our own 
experience.”201  Some judges need to be reminded that their own experiences are 
often limited to the world of the privileged elite. Without those reminders, the 
discrepancy between rich judges and poor litigants can result in socioeconomic bias.  
Studies showing the pervasive nature of implicit bias highlight the need to devote 
more attention to identifying socioeconomic bias in its implicit form.  Indeed, a 
review of Fourth Amendment and child custody cases reveals that this bias is indeed 
present in American courts.  It falls squarely within the role of the ABA Model Code 
of Judicial Conduct to alert judges to the problem of implicit socioeconomic bias.  
However, without specifically defining the term “socioeconomic” or even addressing 
implicit bias, the Code in its current form is failing in this task.  Revising the Code 
and requiring training would help to put the issue of implicit socioeconomic bias on 
the judicial agenda. 
The widening social and economic gap between America’s rich and poor must 
remain outside the doors of our courtrooms.  Judges may enjoy the privileges of 
economic wealth in their personal lives, but they have an obligation on the bench to 
further the fact and appearance of fairness in their decision making. 
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